
Why Islamic Finance Needs Regulation?

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
- Legal Systems
- Rationale for regulations
- Legal framework
- **Regulatory and Supervisory Authorities**
- International Standard Setting Agencies
- Corporate Structure and Regulatory Requirements

Diversity in the Legal Arrangements

Civil Law: Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Indonesia, Lebanon, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Philipines, Thailand.

Common Law: Bangladesh, Msia, Brunei, Hong Kong, Spore, UK

Shariah: GCC Countries, Iran, Sudan, Pakistan and Yemen



WHY ENGLISH LAW IS THE PREFERRED GOVERNING LAW FOR BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS?

Well-known, well-developed and reputable jurisprudence

Independence of the judiciary, the experience and reputation of judges.


The relative speed and efficiency with which commercial disputes can be resolved through the English courts or ADR mechanisms.

Party Autonomy and Legal Certainty.

Transparent, consistent, stable and predictable.

Providing freedom of contract and a pro-business approach as having an emphasis on the text of the contractual arrangements between parties.

Why Islamic finance needs regulation? (1)





Protecting the Interest of Depositors and Investment Account Holders



CASA holders are capital guaranteed.



Why? (2)

IAH: do not enjoy capital guarantee



Disclosure



Sufficient security assurance

Why? (3)

Ensuring compliance with Shariah

Regulatory requirement Tainted income has to be cleansed

Credibility and competence of legal avenues Shariah board and corporate governance

Why? (4)



Why? (5)

Financial systems are prone to instability

Numerous banks failures

Why? (6)

Consumer confidence

Degree of assurance and lower transaction cost

Over-Restrictive Regulation?

 While regulation is expected to govern and regulate the market effectively as in the case of Malaysia, it is worth emphasizing that overrestrictive regulation can also be counter-productive and may impede the development of Islamic Islamic finance industry as a whole.

Why?

IF was closed in 10/02/2001 due to financial distress and weak corporate ٠ Ihlas finance in Turkey governance. Failure of CG and internal checks and balances (Ali, (2007). The IBSA was closed in November 1997 with debt of between R50-R70 million. ٠ **Islamic Bank of South Africa** Lack of supervision from regulatory authority, bad management, weak risk management and numerous loans to insiders (Okeahalam, 1998: 37-38). The closure of the IICE in 1988 was due to the weak of corporate governance, ٠ **Islamic Investment Companies of** ٠ irresponsible management, and improper regulatory frameworks as well as Egypt engaged in Shari'ah non-compliance activities (Zuhaida, 1990). This refer to the fraud case in DIB involving of USD501 million. Seven ٠ individuals have been charged including two Dubai Islamic Bank former **Dubai Islamic Bank** executives (Morris, 2009). Weak internal control. Losses, totaling RM457 million in 2005 (Parker, 2005). The composition of the ٠ board was not appropriate as there were no board members who were familiar Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad. ٠ with banking sectors as well as no sound and proper credit and debt collection (Parker, 2005). Failure to asses risk to compensate the regulatory constraints. The BOD and ٠ Patni Cooperative Credit Society management failed to asses regulatory risk in which led to numerous problems and difficulties (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006).

Case Study: Ihlas Finans

- 1. Accumulation of bad debt- Politically motivated lending and lending to connected business. Finance the businesses of its parent company, Ihlas Holdings.
- 2. Lax Regulation- Law on full guarantee of the bank deposits offered by the State made banking a lucrative business for the corrupt entrepreneurs with political connections who set up banks that siphoned off money.
- 3. Major proportion of the investment was an illiquid assets and projects as compared to other domestic and foreign commercial banks who could hold very liquid government securities.
- 4. Failures in CG and lack of internal checks and balances:- Control failure, Management failure and regulatory failure.

A rubber stamp board of directors, Lax Attitude towards governance, Some members appointed to the board did not have requisite experience, Only one institutional member i.e. IDB as minority shareholder and thus it was easy to manipulate the Board

Control

Failures

Board members are ignorant of financial and economic facts and working of the company , board members are not motivated, Some board members had conflict of interest owing to their dual role as board members as well as clients of finance from Ihlas Finans Holdings

The Bank staff lack relevant experience and training

The bank is run on trust without proper systems of internal control Not preparing enough for changing regulations, No Crisis Management Plan, Decision making during crisis was ad-hoc and uncoordinated internally Connected Lending and Investment Concentration, Executive Selection Hired a senior executive from a previously failed bank

Management Failures

Allowing Withdrawal from Investment Accounts, Failure to manage liquidity risk Indulge in fraudulent practices, some of the mudharabah agency financing was done in the name of fictitious parties while the funds were used for solving internal financial problems

Drastic application of rules

Lax Supervision

Regulatory Failures

Lacuna in supervision of law

Unclear scope of deposit protection law and confusion on who is the authority

Legal Framework

Body empowers to enact the laws

The applicable laws

The relevant regulatory and supervisory authorities

Persons who are subject to the laws

Adjudication

Effective Legal Framework

1. An enabling environment that accommodates and facilitates the development of the industry

2. Facilitates and allows access to investors

3. Credible and reliable forum for legal disputes.

Components of Legal Framework

Banking and finance law: licensing and regulation

Tax law: incentives

Business law: real economic activities, trading.

Property law: to hold properties

Insolvency law: recovery

Securities law: capital market

Employment law: qualified employee

Dispute resolution framework: court or arbitration.


Legal Approaches

Apply the same existing legal framework as for conventional: UK

Adapt or amend the existing legal framework mainly through subsidiary legislation or insertion of provision under existing laws: Bahrain

Totally new and separate legal framework: Malaysia

IFIs in Malaysia



Regulators

BNM

Securities Commission

LOFSA

BNM

- BNM-CBA 2009: Stability of monetary, financial and payment system.
- 1. IBS
- 2. IIMM
- 3. ICM
- 4. IDM
- 5. IEM
- 6. Takaful

CBA 2009

To provide the BNM with necessary power to carry out its mandate

Greater clarity in term of mandates

Autonomy achievement of mandates

Financial and monetary stability

CBA 2009

1. Acknowledgement; dual system: S27

Mandate to NSAC: s
 and s 57

3. Commitment to promote MIFC: s 68.

International Standard Setting Agencies



Corporate Structure

	Regulation		Regulator		
Guidelines on Governance	Electing BOD/				
Code of Conduct	Approving Key Policy		Shareholder		
Infrastructure	Investor/				
Due Diligence	Shareholder Protection		BOD		Shari'ah Board
Communication	Board	Risk	Audit	Governance	
Internal Control	Oversight	Committee	Committee	Committee	نــــــا
Monitoring					
Enforcement					Internal Shari'ah Compliance
	Management Oversight	Risk Management	Internal Audit	Compliance Officer	Unit/ Department

Key Participants	Interest	Functional Roles
• Regulatory /Supervisory authority	• Economic Stability and Compliance with the laws and regulation	 Set regulatory framework for sound and proper CG To supervise and monitor the effectiveness of CG and to check compliance with regulation
Shareholders	• Wealth maximization; Satisfactory earnings per share; Dividends;	• Appoint fit and proper boards, management auditors and <i>Shari'ah</i> board
• IAH	• Repayment of deposits on the agreed terms; Protection of their interests and Profit	To monitor the investment performance
• <i>Shari'ah</i> Board	• Compliance with <i>Shari'ah</i>	• To ensure <i>Shari'ah</i> compliance and protect the rights and interest of depositors and other stakeholder.
• BOD	• Monetary and non-monetary compensation;	• To set the IFIs direction and policies
• Management	• Monetary and non-monetary compensation and commitment to claims of the contract.	• To implement policies set by the BOD